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This dissertation examines the developing countries participation and usage of the World Trade 
Organization’s dispute settlement system. Although the World Trade Organization provides 
equal rights and obligation to enter into the dispute settlement process for all member countries, 
the litigation process is complex and costly for developing countries. There are various 
limitations for developing country participation when they want to use the dispute settlement 
mechanism and this dissertation mainly discusses the lack of legal and financial means of 
developing countries. In this regard, this dissertation examines possible solution which could 
increase developing country participation in the dispute settlement mechanism. These 
alternative resolutions may address the problem of the participation of developing countries in 
the dispute settlement system and it also try to develop a more effective working dispute 
settlement mechanism for developing countries. Therefore, World Trade Organization system 
could propose significant reforms in the Dispute Settlement Body which encourage developing 
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Problem and Background  
 
Globalization of the world increases trade volume and impacts on economic and social 
development. Countries have been trying to develop their economies within this international 
trend and international trade may be seen as a major factor for development and economic 
welfare. In this regard, countries have established a global platform to control international 
economic activities and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to 
as ‘The GATT’) was established in 1947 as an outcome of various trade negotiation rounds. 
After GATT, countries adopted the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as ‘The 
WTO’) in 1995 in order to deal with international trade and economic matters. The WTO has 
been playing a very important role in the field of international trade and international trade law 
to date.  
 
The world economy suffered as the de-globalization trend evolved between the dates of 
1914 and 1945, caused by  World War I, the Great Depression and  World War II.1 Countries 
pulled back to concentrate on nationally focused and state-controlled economies and 
consequently the international trade declined sharply. 
 
World War II built trade barriers between the countries and caused considerable damage to 
the post-war generation; it also created unstable economies and devastated economic structure. 
Countries closed their borders to other countries, they raised trade barriers. The protectionist 
approach by governments worsened trade and the employment rate worldwide. The world 
economy was in a state of collapse at the end of the World War II as a foreseeable outcome.  
In the post-war years however, a new era of international trade and world economy began. 
Countries started to demolish the barriers which prevented free trade and international 
relationships by entering into political negotiations and trade agreements. The pace of world 
trade pace increased through the growth of import and export levels between countries. There 
was a shift from a protectionist approach to international free trade for many countries. The 
trend towards free trade in the western world supported world economic liberalization and it is 
the root of the contemporary world economy today. As international trade increased 
                                            
1 The World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World Trade (2013) p 
5. 
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tremendously, there was a realisation of a great need to regulate the trade relationship between 
countries. Re-globalization gave birth to various international organizations namely the United 
Nations (hereinafter referred to as ‘The UN’), the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘IMF’), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘The World Bank’), the GATT and the WTO at a later stage. Within the scope 
of those international organizations, the multilateral trading system started to make a 
contribution to the world economic stability. 
 
After World War II, 22 countries gathered to sign the GATT in 1947 which was a temporary 
agreement regulating tariffs and international trade.2 The GATT was a part of the Havana 
Charter  for the International Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to as ‘The ITO’) during 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment and as ITO never came into force, 
the GATT remained a temporary agreement through the Protocol of Provisional Application.3 
It was the principal regulating institution for international trade from 1947 to 1995 and its 
provisions incorporated into the GATT 1994 which became a component of the WTO 
Agreement in 1995.4 
 
The WTO system has made a huge effort to remove barriers to trade and has improved the 
export and import level between its contracting states. The WTO adopted a single undertaking 
approach which incorporates all 29 agreements and understandings.5 The goal of the single 
undertaking approach is to integrate the multilateral trading system. One of the most important 
component of the WTO is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter referred to as ‘Dispute Settlement Understanding’ or 
‘DSU’). Dispute settlement became the central pillar of the multilateral trading system and it 
is one of the most successful contributions of the WTO to the stability of the global economy.6 
It became an integral part of the WTO and it is binding for all contracting states.  
 
                                            
2 John H. Jackson The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations 
(2000) p 16. 
3 ‘GATT 1947 and GATT 1994: What’s the difference?’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gatt_e/gatt_e.htm, accessed on 24 January 2017. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed) International Trade Law and The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997) 
p 13.  
6 ‘Understanding The WTO: Settling Disputes a Unique Contribution’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, accessed on 10 November 2016. 
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The WTO dispute settlement system is one of the most effective and binding international 
instrument. The dispute settlement mechanism ensures the states’ rights and the flow of trade 
by enforcing the WTO rules. After several trade negotiations, states agreed that the WTO’s 
rule-oriented dispute settlement mechanism would be beneficial for all because they ensure 
that government policies will be more predictability by allowing contracting parties to access 
foreign markets, they hinder discriminatory trade barriers such as quantitative restrictions, they 
create a reliable environment for producers, traders and investors and they provide more 
transparent policy instruments by limiting potential state intervention.7  
1.2 Research Question  
 
In theory, all contracting states have equal rights to access the dispute settlement mechanism 
under WTO. However, mainly developed countries take advantage of the rule-based system 
and participation of developing countries has not been satisfactory since the establishment of 
WTO in 1995. In fact, many developing countries do not prefer to use the dispute settlement 
system for various reasons, mainly the significant expenses and unclear benefits of 
participating. There are number of constraints that limit the participation of developing 
countries in dispute settlement system such as lack of financial and legal resources and power 
based enforcement mechanism. In this regard, many developing WTO members such as India8, 
African Group9, Kenya10 proposed improvements of WTO DSU. This dissertation will 
demonstrate the statistics that bigger economies are able to participate to the WTO DSU more 
than smaller economies. Developing countries compromise the majority of all WTO members. 
Two-thirds of the WTO’s approximately 150 members are developing countries.11 For 
instance, 38.3 per cent of the total complaints are brought by either USA or the EU.12 
 
Developing countries’ participation in the WTO dispute settlement is however essential for 
a multilateral trading system. If developing countries actively engage in the dispute settlement 
                                            
7 World Trade Organization op cit note 1 at 11. 
8 Submission of the Communication from India on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Honduras, 
Jamaica and Malaysia to the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body ‘Dispute Settlement Understanding 
Proposals: Legal Text’ TN/DS/W/47, 11 February 2003. 
9 Submission of the African Group to the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body TN/DS/W/15, 25 
September 2002. 
10 Submission of the Communication from Kenya to the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body ‘Text for 
The African Group Proposals on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations’ TN/DS/W/42, 24 January 2003. 
11 World Trade Organization, Understanding The WTO 5 ed (2015) p 93. 
12 Please see Table 1. 
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system, it is argued that multilateral trading and economic growth will increase. Therefore, to 
get more insight and understanding about the difficulties and possible solutions for more active 
and effective system for all member states. 
 
I have chosen as research questions the following:  
Why do most developing countries fail to bring claims before the WTO and why are they 
hesitant to use of the WTO DSU process? 
 
This dissertation will focus and discuss the following matters: 
 
 The function of the WTO and the dispute settlement system. 
 The developing countries’ role in the WTO dispute settlement system.  
 The constraints of developing countries participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system and its underlying reasons. 
 Providing possible solutions to promote active participation of developing countries in 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
 
My dissertation discusses reasons of the limited participation of developing countries in 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In that sense, I suggest alternative solutions to promote 
developing countries participation. My research will contribute to the existing discussions 
about DSU reform and position of developing countries within the system.  
1.3 Research Objective 
 
Developing countries’ participation in the WTO dispute settlement system has created a large 
amount of research and academic writing by legal scholars, attorneys, economists. It is a highly 
debated topic and researchers have been contributing to the existing academic knowledge by 
conducting various sophisticated analyses such as a legalistic approach, various economy 
models and empirical case studies.  
 
One of the most important and guiding principles of the DSU is to establish an equal 
platform for all in which every member state could bring a claim against any kind of violation 
and have it fully investigated under the WTO. In this regard, the rules and dispute settlement 
system provides equal rights and obligations as well as right to equal access to the litigation 
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procedure for developed, developing and least developed countries regardless of their 
economic growth. However, lack of developing countries’ effective participation is the 
concern. The international trade system and its rules are perceived to have been designed for 
richer countries and have under-represented developing countries’ interests within the WTO 
dispute settlement system. On the other hand, it is clear that the developing countries’ role is 
becoming significant in the global economy and their concerns may differ compared to 
developed countries. This dissertation will investigate the underlying reasons of lack of 
participation in WTO dispute settlement system and possible alternative solutions for 
improving developing countries participation.  
 
The conclusion of this dissertation will contribute to the knowledge of the status of 
developing countries within the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and the possible ways 
empowering them to be part of the international binding legal mechanism. 
1.4 Methodology 
 
A descriptive research method will be conducted in this research through interpretation and 
argumentation of the relevant sources of law. The research methodology is based on existing 
literature and documentation and it entails a review of primary and secondary sources such as 
legislation, conventions, books, legal journals, articles, case studies, research papers as well as 
WTO legal documentation and official publications. A wide range of electronic sources and 
online WTO secretariat data will be considered. The information required to unpack why 
developing countries do not participate the dispute settlement system will be accessed by 
examining the WTO publications. All the resources can be accessed via the library, internet 
and various legal online database/sources. International materials regarding this dissertation 
will be mainly obtained via the WTO official website and publications. 
 
The WTO’s relevant legislations, WTO case law and the official publications compromise 
the major sources. Specifically, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 1994, Understanding 
On Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1994 and Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization will be our main focus to understand 
the structure of WTO.  
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A general overview of the secondary sources such as existing literature, articles, legal 
journals, legal reviews, commentaries and books on the WTO law and the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism will be also used. 
 
Explanatory research methodology will be also used to address the law and explain it. In 
this regard, the dissertation will provide a historical background of the WTO and its relevant 
legislation. The following chapters will provide explanation and comments on the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism and role of the developing countries within the system.  
1.5 Limitations 
 
In general, this dissertation will be conducted by assessing existing literature and legal writings 
as a research methodology. It gives access to the content analysis on the WTO dispute 
settlement matters and therefore it has a subjective character as the researcher has used 
discretion in their specific analysis. This is one of the potential limitations on accessing the 
research. The characteristics of the methodology influence the interpretation of my findings. 
 
I will be conducting an extensive investigation into the existing literature and 
documentation as using the primary and secondary sources and I will interpret them 
accordingly. Therefore, the research will cover the scholarly approaches to the research 
problem and research question however, this dissertation does not provide an economic 
analysis of the impact of developing country participation on international trade. In this regard, 
this research does not provide a complete picture of statistical assessments. The correlation 
between the developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system and its 
economic impact to the global trade is not analysed. Moreover, this research does not provide 
surveys or empirical case study on the basis of interviews with government officials or WTO 
officials in Geneva, Switzerland.  
 
It is the aim of this research to follow the guidance of the literature and implement this in 
the methodology of the research. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This dissertation will be examined under five interrelated chapters. 
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Chapter 1 provides an overview and general background of the research topic. The 
objective of the research and the research questions also sets out in this chapter. The general 
structure and outline of each chapters are also provided. The research methodology and 
limitations which will be utilised to analyse the research topic is also covered in the 
introduction. 
Chapter 2 compromises the historical background and establishment of the WTO system 
and its position within the field of international trade law. The reform from the GATT system 
to the WTO, significant outcomes of the trade negotiations and the development of rule based 
dispute settlement system will be discussed. I will be questioning the need for entering into 
such international trade agreements and regulating the dispute resolution mechanism globally.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the Uruguay negotiation rounds and the birth of the DSU. It reviews 
the historical transformation from GATT to WTO and the development of the system after 
GATT and the Uruguay Round. It examines the whole process to access to the dispute 
settlement procedures under WTO.  
Chapter 4 assesses the position of developing countries and their importance within the 
WTO dispute settlement system. The definition of developing country and their significant 
contribution to the international trade will be examined in this section. I will be examining the 
provisions of WTO Dispute Settlement System in regards to privileges for developing 
countries. The lack of participation of developing countries and its legal and economic reasons 
are also covered.  Developing countries face major challenges at the time when they want to 
make use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System against the developed countries. In general, 
there is a lack of legal competence in the field of WTO law, lack of economic sources to take 
advantage of the system and economic and politic reasons preventing to take initiatives against 
the developed countries. The chapter also addresses the current data provided by the WTO and 
various international research databases regarding the participation of developing countries in 
the WTO dispute settlement system.  
Chapter 5 explores the alternative solutions to promote developing country participation in 
WTO’s dispute settlement system. Alternative methods of dispute settlement such as 
consultation and mediation can serve for the improvement of the developing country 
participation. Possible roles of the advisory centre on the WTO law, private law firms and 
public-private partnership will be also discussed. Finally, it provides concluding remarks and 
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some recommendations regarding how can developing countries position themselves within 
the international trade law and how to benefit from the WTO dispute settlement system. I will 
discuss my opinion regarding the most effective approach.  
  
 16 
CHAPTER II HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW  
2.1 The History of International Trade Law and The International Trade 
Organization Negotiations 
 
‘The great force of history comes from the fact that we carry it within us, are unconsciously 
controlled by it in many ways, and history is literally present in all that we do.’13  
Evaluating the present and the future of international trade law and the role of international 
organizations regulating the world trade begins with an undertsanding of the history of 
international trade.  World War I, the Great Depression and  World War II resulted in an era of 
de-globalization between the years of 1914 and 1945.14 Countries refrained from global 
economic integration and instead they adopted a protectionist approach to focus on more 
domestic and state controlled economic models.15 The countries protected their domestic 
market by raising  trade barriers.16 As the global economy disintergrated,  international trade 
decreased sharply. After the Great Depression in 1930s and the World War II in 1940s, the 
world’s economy  started to transform through the process of re-globalization and the pace of  
global economic integration was accelerated.17 The devastating outcome of the wars and 
economic crises had showed that a protectionist approach needed to come to an end. Thus, the 
nations18 attempted to prevent the unstable world economy after the World War II and global 
trade arose through increasing the volume of imports and exports among countries. The nations 
attempted to build a free international economic regime by establishing international 
institutional structures to address the economic and political issues globally.19 After  World 
War II, the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as ‘The US’), the United Kingdom 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘The UK’) and other alliances led to several trade negotiations in 
order to create global rules for the post war international economy.20 The policymakers 
considered  structures of international organizations to govern international economic 
                                            
13 James Baldwin The Price of the Ticket: Collected Nonfiction 1948-1985 (1985). 
14 World Trade Organization op cit note 1 at 46.   
15 Ibid at 52. 
16 Ibid at 51.  
17 Ronald Findlay & Kevin H. O'Rourke Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second 
Millennium (2007) ch 9. 
18 Specifically, the US, European Countries and the UK. 
19 Richard E. Mshomba Africa and The World Trade Organization (2009) p 5.  
20 ‘Milestones: 1937–1945: Bretton Woods-GATT, 1941–1947’ available at 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/bretton-woods, accessed on 8 November 2016. 
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governance and collaboration.21 In this regard, the main four institutional bodies came to an 
existence: The UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the ITO (later GATT and the WTO)22. The UN 
was established in 1945 to maintain  international peace and security23; the IMF was formed in 
1944 and it was intended to set up a stable monetary regime to avoid a repetition of the 
economic fluctuations which had led to the Great Depression in 1930s24; the World Bank was 
established in 1944 to assist Europe rebuild post World War II25; and finally the attempts  to 
establish the ITO to  govern international trade affairs.26 This political attempt was handled 
successfully and all the international organizations were established except the ITO.27  
The countries’ idea of establishing the ITO was derived from a need for rebuilding the 
world trading system after the devastating period of the war.28 They intended to establish the 
ITO as a third international institution alongside the IMF and the World Bank during the UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, Cuba in 1947 (the Bretton Conference) in 
order to complete international economic cooperation and to address international trade and 
economic relationships.29 However, efforts to create the ITO under the Havana Charter30 in 
1948 as a specialized agency of the UN failed because the Congress of the US did not ratify 
the agreement because its detailed regulations would undermine the national sovereignty in 
terms of trade policy.31 The draft of the Havana Charter was very ambitious; it was not only a 
trade agreement but it was also regulating a wide range of fields including but not limited to 
employment policies, labour issues, intergovernmental commodity agreements and restrictive 
business conduct.32 For all these reasons, the first attempt to create an international 
organization under an institutional umbrella regarding the free trade failed. The ITO Charter 
never came into being and it was deemed as dead and ill-fated but following the failure of the 
                                            
21 Ivan D. Trofimov ‘The Failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO): A Policy Entrepreneurship 
Perspective’ (2012) 5:1 Journal of Politics and Law p 56.   
22 Ibid at 56.  
23 ‘Maintain International Peace and Security’ available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/maintain-
international-peace-and-security/index.html, accessed on 8 November 2016.  
24 ‘About the IMF’ available at http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm, accessed on 8 November 2016.  
25 ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and Development’ available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do/brief/ibrd, accessed on 8 November 2016. 
26 Ivan D. Trofimov op cit note 21 at 56.  
27 Ibid at 56.  
28 World Trade Organization, GATT Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 6 ed (1995). 
29 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 15. 
30 The Havana Charter for the ITO was adopted in The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. 
However, the said Charter never came into force.  
31 Bernard M. Hoekman & Philip English & Aaditya Mattoo Development, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook 
(2002) p 41. 
32 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 15.  
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ITO, countries continued separate negotiations in order to reduce customs tariffs and to fix 
binding tariffs.33 
2.2 History of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
 
After the failure to establish the ITO as a new multilateral trading system, the countries conducted separate 
negotiations on reduction of trade barriers in December 1945 to increase trade liberalization and to correct 
the ills resulting from the early 1930s.34 As a result of the trade negotiations, the GATT took the place of 
the ITO, adopting most of the ITO’s Commercial Policy Chapter and rules.35 Consequently, the roots of 
the GATT agreement can be found in the ITO Charter. The countries relied on the sole remaining trade 
agreement, the GATT, to govern and liberalize the global trade while it was operating as a provisional 
international organization and agreement between the dates of 1948 and 1994.36 The new trade 
agreement, the GATT, was negotiated between 23 original founding countries37 and  thirteen of them 
might be classified as developing countries.38 The final original treaty establishing GATT was signed on 
30 October 1947 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva by those 23 founding members officially called as 
contracting parties under the GATT and it came into force on 1 January 1948.39 It was seen as a 
provisional agreement and organization that integrated into the Havana Charter.40 The contracting parties 
had started to apply the provisions of the GATT provisionally. Throughout its 47 years of existence as a 
provisional agreement, it intended to reduce the trade barriers among its contracting parties. The GATT 
became the sole multilateral instrument regulating international trade and the tariff concessions and came 
into effect on 30 June 1948 by implementing the Protocol of Provisional Application.41 As a result, the 
GATT has addressed the international trade relations and policy between its contracting states for 47 
years. The GATT has been reformed through a set of subsequent multilateral negotiations, namely trade 
rounds, and there have been eight trade rounds placed during the 47 years of GATT history. These led to 
                                            
33 Craig VanGrasstek The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (2013) p 43. 
34 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 15.  
35 Robert E. Hudec Essays on the Nature of International Trade Law (1999) p 36. 
36 World Trade Organization op cit note 1 at 52.  
37Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Canada, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, China, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia), France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Syria, United Kingdom, and United 
States. ‘World Trade Organization Press Brief Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System’ available 
at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm, accessed on 8 October 2016. 
38 Chad P. Bown‘Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes’(2004) 27:1 
The World Economy p 59. “These countries included Brazil, Burma, Chile, Czechoslovak Republic, Cuba, India, 
Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Zimbabwe. This does not include China, which 
was also a founding Contracting Party to the GATT.”  
39 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 15.  
40 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann op cit note 5 at 10. 
41 Patrick Love & Ralph Lattimore International Trade: Free, Fair and Open? (2009) ch 5 p 78.  
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significant reforms in global trade which reduced tariffs between the contracting states until the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995.42 Thus, unlike the detailed rules and the strict nature of the ITO, the 
contracting states were able to negotiate the rules during the trade rounds under the GATT. It provided 
more flexibility to its contracting states. There has been Geneva Round in 1947 regarding tariffs, Annecy 
Rounds in 1949 regarding tariffs, Torquay Round in 1951 regarding tariffs, Geneva Round in 1956 
regarding tariffs, Geneva (Dillon) Round in between 1960 and 1961 regarding tariffs and the 
establishment of the European Economic Community, Geneva (Kennedy) Round in between 1964 and 
1967 regarding tariffs and anti-dumping measures, Geneva (Tokyo) Round in between 1973 and 1979 
regarding tariffs, non-tariff measures and framework agreements and finally Geneva (Uruguay) Round 
in between 1986 and 1994 regarding tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property 
rights, dispute settlement mechanism, textiles, agriculture, agricultural subsidies, the creation of the WTO, 
and so on.43   
 
In conclusion, in the course of 47 years, the GATT contributed to the international trade. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that despite its provisional nature, the contracting states 
contributed to the free trade, promoted the global trade liberalization and reduced the barriers 
to trade through series of trade rounds under the GATT. On the other hand, it is considered that 
the GATT played a very important role as an international institution for the world economic 
development. 
2.3 History of the World Trade Organization  
 
The GATT operated for 47 years and it produced huge numbers of complex trade agreements 
throughout its existence. The last trade round namely Uruguay Round was concluded between 
the dates of 1986 and 1994.44 At the end of eight years of comprehensive Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations within the context of the GATT, a new international economic organization 
providing the institutional structure, the WTO, came into effect on 1 January 1995.45 Therefore, 
the WTO Agreement resulting from the Uruguay Round is deemed as 'the most important event 
in recent economic history' and the WTO as the ‘central international economic institution’.46 
                                            
42 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 16.  
43 Ibid at 16. 
44 Ibid at 18.  
45 John H Jackson ‘Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems’ (1998) 1:3 Journal of International 
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Consequently, the GATT gave birth to the WTO as giving its dynamics and finally it was 
superseded by the WTO in 1995. Unlike the GATT, the WTO had a far stronger institutional 
structure. Additionally, the WTO is described as the sole worldwide international organization 
governing the trade rules between the states at a global or near-global level.47 It is a forum for 
trade negotiations between its member governments to resolve their trade issues and settling 
trade disputes and it is an international institution for the purpose of liberalizing the global 
trade.48 Moreover, it provides a binding set of trade rules for international trade which are 
negotiated, signed and ratified by the member governments in order to achieve its aim to 
provide a secure trade platform to ensure the producers of goods and services, importers and 
exporters run their business.49 The WTO agreements provide institutional legally binding set 
of rules through the rule-based series of documents for the multilateral trading system. With 
the creation of a new international organization, the multilateral trading system started to 
function within the scope of an institutional legal framework. One of the reasons that states 
were determined to establish a new institutional organization was to add new agreements and 
issues in trade and to widen the scope of the multilateral agreement. In this regard, the WTO 
broadened the scope of the GATT in many ways, such as covering the services, intellectual 
property, and domestic policies of states affecting investment and agriculture, whereas the 
GATT had only dealt with trade in goods.50 
 
In Marrakesh, Morocco at the date of 15 April 1994, representatives of 123 participating 
states signed the final agreement Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter referred to as ‘Marrakesh Agreement’) which establishes the WTO 
as a result of Uruguay Round trade negotiations.51 Although the WTO became an international 
organization replacing the GATT in 1995, the General Agreement remains as an umbrella 
agreement for the WTO for trade in goods.52 The WTO possesses international legal 
personality and authority in its own right independent from its members.53 The countries 
decided to set up a notion of single undertaking at the end of the Uruguay Round which covers 
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all agreements and rules of the GATT under a single operational body.54 They decided to give 
up the à la carte approach under the GATT era which allowed countries to adopt some 
agreements but not others.55 On the contrary, the countries agreed on a single undertaking 
approach which provides every item of the negotiation became the part of the whole package 
and the countries agreed to all the agreements and issues entirely but not separately.56 As Craig 
VanGrasstek stated, “In place of the Tokyo Round’s cafeteria, the Uruguay Round produced a 
fixed-price menu for all participants”.57 As a result, the WTO came into force by the relatively 
short Marrakesh Agreement which covers 16 articles and consists of four annexes.58 
 
The WTO has continued to grow and currently there are 164 member states as at 
29 July 2016.59 The WTO forms a general framework for setting and regulating trade policies 
globally.  As with the GATT system, the WTO gives importance to some basic principles, 
namely non-discrimination, reciprocity, enforceable commitments, transparency, and safety 
valves.60  
 
The preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement resembles the GATT 1947 with some small 
amendments.61 The WTO agreement was accepted as an international institution to govern ‘an 
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results of past trade liberalization efforts,  and all of the 
results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations’.62 The objective of the WTO 
is to raise living standards, ensure the employment, develop trade and production in services 
and goods and to allow effective use of the sources of the world.63 As achieving those purposes, 
it recognizes needs of developing countries within the scope of international trade.64 The way 
to achieve these purposes is the same as stated in the GATT namely ‘reciprocal and mutually 
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advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to 
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations’.65 
 
The functions of the WTO itself were stated under the article 3 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.66 Accordingly, the WTO shall facilitate the implementation of the agreements, it 
shall create a forum for trade negotiations, it shall govern the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, it regulates the trade policy reviews and finally it shall cooperate with the IMF 
and The World Bank. Consequently, the WTO emerged as a highly significant well-structured 
and rule-based organization to reinforce the world trading structure. 
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CHAPTER III GATT AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM  
3.1 Historical Development of Dispute Settlement System: From GATT to WTO 
 
The GATT dispute settlement system was established to promote free international trade 
between its members.67 In this regard, many provisions under the GATT were designed to 
resolve any trade disputes between the member states.68 In that way, the contracting parties 
could have some mechanism to be protected by the laws in case of any other member states 
violate their obligations under the provisions of the GATT. As a natural outcome, a well-
functioning and effective international enforcement mechanism is needed. 
The first dispute settlement mechanism under the GATT 1947 had some provisions on 
settling disputes on trade among its member states. The rules regarding the dispute settlement 
were stated under the articles of XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947.69  
The dispute settlement practice under the GATT evolved on the basis of interpretation and 
elaboration of these Articles. Consequently, these provisions established the fundamental basis 
for dispute settlement procedure under the GATT. Article XXII of GATT 1947 provided a 
consultation opportunity to its contracting parties on the request of any other party to mutually 
settle regarding any issues affecting the function of the GATT Agreement.70 It stated that 
contracting states may consult each other in order to deal with trade disputes between other 
contracting states. In addition to this, the core provision of the GATT regarding dispute 
settlement was stated under the article XXIII which states that in case the parties to a dispute 
are not able to resolve the dispute by consultation, they can use the main dispute settlement 
mechanism under article XXIII of GATT 1947.71 The contracting parties may invoke this 
article on the basis of ‘nullification and impairment’ in case there is a situation that a member 
state is concerned that it did not take advantage of the benefits which it was entitled under the 
GATT.72 Primarily, as is mentioned above, the GATT Agreement provided a mutually agreed 
resolution to the disputes by using the method of consultation. However, if the consultation did 
not work to resolve the matters in dispute, all the contracting parties convened to assess the 
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matter in dispute and as a result of the investigations they issued a ruling or a recommendation 
and the necessary measures were taken as a sanction if necessary.73 Thus, the contracting 
parties aimed to protect the injured party and rights of all other member states by enforcing the 
rules. 
One of the most important key factors existing under GATT system was the positive 
consensus rule.74 Accordingly, every stage of the dispute settlement mechanism including a 
panel establishment, adaptation of a panel report and authorization of the countermeasures 
required a positive consensus among the contracting parties.75 It was highly criticised and 
considered the weakest point of the dispute settlement system under the GATT Agreement 
1947.76 Positive consensus requires all the contracting party’s positive vote and there should 
be no objections from any of the state party to the dispute.77 It was significant because it means 
that even the parties to the dispute - both the respondent and claimant - play an active role in 
the decision making process. Accordingly, the parties to disputes could delay and block the 
dispute settlement process in different ways because gaining consent of the disputing parties 
can take time and this can cause considerable delays in the process. In essence, the dispute 
cannot be solved without a consent.78 The disputing parties are able to participate in the 
decision making process when they refer a dispute to a panel. Therefore, the respondent has 
ability to block the panel’s establishment. Furthermore, at the end of the panel proceedings the 
panel report must also be adopted with a positive consensus, which means that the respondent 
party shall also give its consent for the adaptation of the panel report.79 Therefore, the positive 
consensus requirement can establish blocks to the dispute mechanism and it could seldom work 
effectively because the losing party had the power to block the unfavourable decision against 
them. 
Another significant element of the GATT dispute settlement system was that the system 
was neither integrated nor unified and the member states can select a dispute settlement 
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mechanism which suited them best – many called a la carte approach under the GATT.80  
The dispute settlement system under WTO is deemed to be one of the most successful 
instruments in the international trade law and it is the central pillar of the multilateral trading 
system which contributes to the stability and predictability of the global economy.81 Although 
the WTO is a ‘court with no bailiff’82 and has no jail, it relies on voluntary compliance of its 
sovereign country members which promotes execution of WTO’s trade rules.83 The 
effectiveness of the WTO regime derives from its dispute settlement system to enforce its rules 
either at the consultation stage or at the panel stage to a ruling.84 Therefore, an effective and 
binding dispute settlement system is essential for operating of the WTO. As a result, member 
countries achieved the establishment of that system by introducing the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.85 The WTO dispute settlement system is a central element to ensure the 
security and predictability of the world trade system.86  
This successful dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO does not only belongs to the 
WTO but also the dispute settlement system under the GATT 1947. The WTO has expanded 
the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT dispute settlement law and practice.87 In this 
regard, the DSU under the WTO has its roots in the GATT because the WTO inherited the 
main general agreement of the GATT involving dispute settlement provisions.88 The WTO 
DSU has made a major amendment within the functioning of the system despite article XXII 
and article XXIII of the GATT which remains as a fundamental dispute settlement mechanism 
under the DSU.89 The contracting states’ concern on the positive consensus requirement 
reflected to the Uruguay Round negotiations. During the GATT years, the contracting states 
could block the process because of the positive consensus requirement  and a panel report might 
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remain in ‘legal limbo’.90 The radical reform in dispute settlement has been made by removing 
the positive consensus and instead introducing the negative consensus approach.91 By doing 
so, blocking or delaying the process or the adaptation of a panel report was reduced, resulting 
in a  dispute settlement system which became more independent and automatic. The contracting 
states cannot block the system unless each and every contracting state, including the disputing 
parties, determine to establish a panel or to adopt the panel report.92 So, if the losing party 
wanted to block the panel’s establishment or adopting a panel report, it had to persuade all 
other contracting parties, including the winning party. Therefore, the system suddenly evolved 
to a more judicial structure by giving its ‘teeth’ to the GATT.93 In addition to that reform, the 
DSU under WTO has established an integrated system and the contracting states could bring 
their claims on any multiple trade disputes under various agreements annexed to the Marrakesh 
Agreement.94 This new rule removed a la carte approach, thus eliminating the situation of the 
existence of multiple disputes on the same subject matter under various agreements.95 
The contracting parties also agreed on some significant decisions and undertakings prior to 
Uruguay Round namely:96 
 
 The Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures under Article XXIII; 
 The Understanding on Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, 
adopted on 28 November 1979; 
 The Decision on Dispute Settlement, contained in the Ministerial Declaration of 29 
November 1982; 
 The Decision on Dispute Settlement of 30 November 1984. 
 
At the end of the Uruguay Round, member countries both developed and developing were 
aware of the problems from the GATT system and it required an effective transformation. The 
Uruguay Round negotiations was the place for all the contracting parties to sit and discuss 
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some developments to the provisions and procedures of the GATT dispute settlement.97 As a 
result, these negotiations provided a platform to set new WTO rules for dispute settlement 
system. 
3.2 The Uruguay Negotiation Round and Birth of the DSU   
 
In September of 1986, the contracting parties to the GATT launched a new multilateral trade 
round in Punta del Este, Uruguay to negotiate the policy issues covered under the agenda and 
to reform the GATT agreements and dispute settlement system in order to provide effective 
and prompt dispute resolutions for all member states through improving and strengthening the 
rules. This resulted in a Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round or Ministerial 
Declaration of Punta del Este.98 In accordance with this Ministerial Declaration, the main aim 
of the negotiations on the dispute settlement are as follows:99 
‘In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all 
Contracting Parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and the 
procedures of the dispute settlement process, while recognising the contribution that 
would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines. 
Negotiations shall include the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing 
and monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted 
recommendations.’   
The contracting parties to the GATT 1947 including developing and developed countries 
shared the same vision that the GATT system needed further developmental steps and they 
gave prominence to the dispute settlement negotiations within the scope of the Uruguay 
Round’s agenda.100 During the course of the Uruguay Round, the contracting parties came up 
with a preliminary document called the Decision of 12 April 1989 on Improvements to the 
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GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures.101 Accordingly, the decision covered some 
rules on the adoption of panel reports, time frames for panel proceedings, technical assistance 
to developing countries and effective implementation of the rulings, later embodied in the 
WTO DSU.102 However, the decision did not include provisions on procedure for adopting the 
panel report and appellate review. 
The wholly new body WTO DSU was placed to enforce multilateral disciplines and it was 
deemed as a very significant and positive result of the Uruguay Round which took one step 
further towards to an automatic and rule-oriented dispute settlement mechanism.103 As a result, 
the member states agreed to adopt the Dispute Settlement Understanding as an Annex 2 of the 
WTO Agreement and they have been applying the DSU rules since the its creation 1 January 
1995104, referring to the GATT 1947 DSU rules105 and replacing them with the new WTO DSU 
mechanism. Consequently, creation of the WTO dispute settlement system based on the GATT 
dispute settlement system is deemed as one of the most important innovations resulting from 
the Uruguay Round.106 
The WTO DSU introduced more detailed dispute settlement procedures such as strict time 
frames and specific deadlines in order to create a more predictable timeline for settling 
disputes.107 The new dispute settlement system provides a framework which applies to any of 
the covered agreements with some minor differences.   
As the member states agreed on the single undertaking principle, the WTO DSU provides 
a single set of rules for each and every dispute arising out of the Uruguay Package including 
the WTO itself, the GATT and its annexes such as Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (herein after referred as ‘The GATS’) and the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (herein after referred as 
‘The TRIPS’).108 It means that the scope of WTO’s international trade rules has been broadened 
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to the extent of the same dispute settlement mechanism will be applied and the member 
countries can invoke the same dispute settlement rules for any kinds of disputes on WTO 
issues.  It ensures that the new issues and multilateral agreements under the WTO are subjected 
to an effective dispute settlement system. 
3.3 The Dispute Settlement Process of the WTO 
 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is designed to deal with international trade disputes 
and to resolve disputes between member governments within the scope of their WTO 
obligations.109 The WTO DSU introduced specific time frames to be followed and flexible 
deadlines in different stages for settling disputes to operate effectively and promptly.110 The 
DSU explicitly states that the WTO dispute settlement system is the key factor for ensuring 
predictability and security to the trading system and it protects the rights and obligations of 
member states under the covered agreements namely Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, GATS, TRIPS and Plurilateral 
Trade Agreements.111    
The WTO dispute settlement functioning is supervised by the institutional body called the 
Dispute Settlement Body (hereinafter referred to as ‘The DSB’).112 The DSB is simply the 
General Council of the WTO and there are representatives of all member states in the DSB.113  
It is the authorized body ‘to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain 
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of 
concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements’.114   
The WTO dispute settlement function provides five phases: consultations, the panel 
process, the appellate review process, surveillance of implementation of recommendation and 
rulings and lastly the compensation and the suspension of concessions.115 
First phase is the consultation phase. The WTO initially encourages the member states to 
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settle disputes cooperatively through direct consultations.116  The dispute settlement 
mechanism aims a positive resolution to a dispute and it is preferable to agree on a mutually 
acceptable solution between the disputing parties, which should be consistent with the WTO 
agreements.117 By this way, the consultation phase provides disputing parties to understand 
reason of the dispute, the parties’ legal basis for their claims, and preferably to resolve the 
dispute before going to panel proceedings.118  
‘Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its judgement as to whether action under 
these procedures would be fruitful.  The aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to 
secure a positive solution to a dispute.  A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a 
dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. …’.119 
This provision gives opportunity to the parties to a dispute to settle their dispute at any 
phase in the dispute settlement procedure through negotiating a settlement.120 Member states 
may submit a request to consult with another WTO member state if the complainant party has 
concerns that another member state has breached its obligation under the WTO agreement or 
the infringement has caused an adverse effect on the complainant party and the action 
constitutes a case of nullification or impairment.121 The nullification or impairment is presumed 
to reduces the WTO benefits to the complainant party.122 On the request of the complainant 
party requesting consultation, the other member state could start consultations within 30 days 
and if the latter party refuses to enter into consultation then the complainant party may request 
the panel’s establishment.123
 
Similarly, if the consultation phase did take place but has broken 
down and cannot produce a mutually agreed settlement within the period of 60 days following 
the receipt of the request for consultation, the complainant party may request the establishment 
of a panel.124 The statistics shows that approximately one-half of the disputes are negotiated 
between the member governments in the consultation phase and they are either resolved, settled 
or abandoned which means that some of the cases have been concluded by the consultation 
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requirement.125 
Secondly, as it is stated above, the panel stage came into existence to assess the particular 
dispute subject matter in case the parties to a dispute fails to settle in the consultation phase.126 
Upon the written request of the complainant party, the DSB shall establish a panel unless it 
determines by consensus not to establish a panel.127 The DSU specifies a standard terms of 
reference for a panel if the parties otherwise agreed:  
‘To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s) 
cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the DSB by (name of party) in 
document ... and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the 
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s)’.128 
In this regard, the DSB needs to examine and assess the facts of the given claims cited by 
the disputing parties which fall in the scope of the related covered agreement(s).  
 
The panel’s composition under the DSU is specified that it shall include three or, if the 
parties mutually agree, five well-qualified individual panellists.129 The panellists shall be 
selected from diverse backgrounds by ensuring the independence of the panel.130 The detailed 
set of processes to be followed by the panel is explained under the Working Procedures of the 
DSU.131 A feature of these provisions is that the deliberations of the panel is confidential.132 
The appointed panel shall submit its examination and the final report to the disputing parties 
within 6 months following the date of composition of the panel and issuance of the terms of 
reference.133 The provision also provides an accelerated time frame for emergency cases, in 
which case the panel shall issue its final report within 3 months.134  Once the panel issues its 
final report, it is to be adopted as a ruling or recommendation within 60 days unless the DSB 
reaches a consensus to reject it or the parties decides to appeal the decision of the panel.135  
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The third institutional element under the WTO’s dispute settlement system is the appellate 
review phase which is completely a new feature of the system.136 The DSB establishes the 
Appellate Body composed of permanent seven members, three of them work on the case to 
examine/compare the appeal requests from the panel cases.137 An appeal review has limitation 
on the issues of law stated in the panel report and the panel’s legal interpretations.138 Therefore, 
the Appellate Body is not able to investigate and assess new evidences or facts. Appellate Body 
must conduct its examinations within 60 days or in absolute maximum of 90 days from the 
date of a party making a notification of its appeal request till the Appellate Body circulates its 
report.139 The appeal reports shall be adopted or rejected by the DSB within the period of 30 
days and the DSB can only reject the appeal report if there is a consensus against the ruling 
which is very unlikely.140  
 
The fourth element under the WTO’s dispute settlement system is the surveillance of the 
implementation of the recommendation and rulings – this is the compliance stage. Once a panel 
report and/or an Appellate Body report is adopted, the effective compliance of the 
recommendation and rulings of the DSB is of obvious significance in securing the rights and 
benefits of the member states in the dispute settlement system.141 The implementation of the 
decision during the compliance stage is subjected to a reasonable period of time which cannot 
exceed 15 months from the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report142.  The DSB is the 
authorized body to monitor the surveillance of implementation of recommendation and 
rulings143. 
 
The last element of the dispute settlement system’s legal framework is the compensation 
and the suspension of concessions. It gives ‘teeth’ to the dispute settlement mechanism in  case 
of the non-implementation within a reasonable period of time144. In case the respondent party 
does not bring the recommendations and rulings into a complaint with the covered agreement, 
it may decide to negotiate with the complainant party in order to reach a mutually acceptable 
                                            
136 World Trade Organization op cit note 72 at 22.  
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compensation145.  Where the parties cannot reach a mutually agreed solution about the 
compensation during the negotiations within 20 days, a complainant party may request the 
DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations to the violating member state under the 
covered agreements146. It means that in principle, the complainant party is able to request 
retaliation by issuing barriers to trade or raising tariffs on the goods in the same sector to the 
non-compliant party and if this retaliation does not sufficiently compensate then the suspension 
can be imposed across the sectors and agreements147. 
 
In conclusion, these phases within the WTO DSU are designed to resolve the disputes on 
trade between the contracting members and there have been very important reforms to make 
the system more effective. GATT’s diplomacy approach to the disputes evolved in the more 
judicial nature under the WTO system148. The members can always agree mutually to settle 
their disputes at any phase of the dispute settlement. The rules on international trade constitute 
the backbone of the global economy and people all over the world can take advantage of the 
benefits of well-structured international law by conducting business in an international 
arena149.  
  
                                            
145 DSU Article 22(2). 
146 DSU Article 22(2). 
147 Richard E. Mshomba op cit note 19 at 29.  
148 John H Jackson op cit note 45 at 333.  
149 Press Release Director General Mike Moore ‘Changes in the multilateral trading system: Challenges for the 
WTO’ Winconference 2001 Interlaken Switzerland available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm66_e.htm, accessed on 10 November 2016. 
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CHAPTER IV PARTICIPATION OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN THE WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
4.1 What is a Developing Country?  
 
The WTO explicitly states that there is no specific classification of developing country by the 
WTO and so the meaning of a developing country under the WTO is not defined.150 The WTO 
is a member-driven international organization151 and contracting parties can announce their 
own status on the basis of self-designation whether they want to be classified as a developed 
or a developing country.152 Where a country classifies itself as a developing country in order  
to take advantage of the specific provisions available to developing countries, other contracting 
states can challenge the decision.153 Thus, there is a lack of a clear harmonized definition of 
development status under the scope of the WTO legal system. The meaning of the developing 
country is defined neither under the general international law nor the WTO system.154 In this 
regard, the criteria or standard of being a developing country needs a clear definition within 
the scope of the functions of an international trade organization such as the WTO and the 
GATT.  
The WTO also does not provide a clear definition for the ‘least developed countries’ (herein 
after referred as ‘The LDC’), however, article XI(2) of the Marrakesh Agreement explicitly 
acknowledges the category of the LDC granted by the UN.155 In this way, even though it does 
not set out criteria, or a test of the standard for the LDC category, at least it provides a general 
framework and addresses a certain international organization for the definition of LDC by 
referring the UN’s LDC category.156 Likewise, developing countries are defined by some 
significant organizations such as the World Bank,157 United Nations and United Nations 
                                            
150 ‘Who are the developing countries in the WTO?’ available at 
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Statistics Division,158 IMF and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (herein after referred as 
‘The ACWL’).159 The World Bank classifies countries based on their income and there are four 
income groups within this special classification system: low-income economies are defined as 
those with a gross national income per capita of $1,025 or less in 2015, lower middle-income 
economies are those with a gross national income per capita between $1,026 and $4,035; upper 
middle-income economies are those with a gross national income per capita between $4,036 
and $12,475; high-income economies are those with a gross national income per capita of 
$12,476 or more.160 Under the classification system of the United Nations and United Nations 
Statistics Division, there is not a specific designation for developed and developing countries 
and it rather provides a classification based on regions or areas such as Canada in the north of 
America, Japan in Asia deemed as developed countries.161  
The IMF’s publication, World Economic Outlook, provides country classification based on 
export diversification, income rate and integration level into the global economic system.162 
Lastly, the ACWL acts as an independent organization from the WTO and it separated 
developing countries into three categories namely Category A, Category B and Category C 
based on their share of world trade reflecting their per capita income:163   
Members entitled to the services of the ACWL 
CATEGORY A CATEGORY B CATEGORY C 
 Hong Kong, China 
 Chinese Taipei  
 United Arab 
Emirates  





 Côte d’Ivoire  
 Dominican Republic 
 Ecuador 
                                            
158 ‘Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic 
and other groupings’ available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed, accessed on 
6 December 2016. 
159 ‘Members’ available at http://www.acwl.ch/members-introduction/#, accessed on 6 December 2016. 
160 ‘World Bank Country and Lending Groups’ available at 
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accessed on 6 December 2016. 
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162 Lynge Nielsen ‘Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is done and how it 
could be done’ (2011) IMF Working Paper WP/11/31 p 17. 
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 Oman  
 Mauritius  
 Turkey  
 Indonesia  
 Viet Nam  








 Tunisia   
 Jordan  
 El Salvador  
 Sri Lanka  
 Costa Rica  
 Cuba  
 
In the light of designated definitions for developing countries made by several 
organizations, these may influence the WTO to consider a method to classify developing 
countries. This dissertation will use the income classification method prepared by the World 
Bank due to its clear division.164 
4.2 Privileges for Developing Countries in the WTO 
 
The WTO’s approximate 150 members are developing countries which compromise two-thirds 
of the member states.165 As mentioned above, since the WTO does not give a definition of 
developed or developing country, the country has to designate its own status. Every WTO 
developing country member can take advantage of the provisions under WTO Agreements 
called ‘provisions of differential and special treatment’.166 Developing countries have a 
significant role within global trade as they play an active role with their huge volume of trade 
                                            
164 ‘The income classification method’ available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, 
accessed on 6 December 2016. 
165 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 93. 
166 ‘Special and differential treatment provisions’ available at 
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transactions and they see the trade as an important key factor in their development agenda.167 
For that reason, the concerns and needs of developing countries are crucial and it shall be taken 
into consideration for a well-functioning WTO and global trade. 
 
Countries which designate themselves as a developing country in the WTO system can 
receive certain rights and benefits defined under the WTO provisions.168 There are some 
provisions under WTO agreements which provide more favourable rights to developing 
countries. The Marrakesh Agreement which established the WTO recognizes the interests of 
the developing countries under its preamble. It is explicitly stated that:  
 
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that 
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in 
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic 
development.169 
  
It was therefore recognised and agreed that the developing countries needs and their shares 
within the growth of international trade should be secured and recognized in compatibility with 
their economic development needs.170 
 
There are some provisions that give certain privileges in the DSU which provide more 
favourable time frames and procedure for developing countries. The profile of developing 
countries is highly diverse so their needs and interests may vary in line with their economic 
developments.171 In this regard, the WTO created three ways to deal with these special and 
different needs of developing countries:172 
 
 There are special provisions under some of the WTOAgreements. 
 The Committee on Trade and Development is authorized to provide guidelines for the 
technical assistance, technology transfer and trade on topics of development in the 
WTO and the trade of developing countries. 
                                            
167 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 93. 
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 The WTO technical assistance and training programme is regulated by the Committee 
on Trade and Development for developing countries. In this regard, WTO’s trade-
related technical assistance is governed by the WTO Secretariat in order to maintain 
sustainable trade capacity-building for the member states including developing 
countries. 
In addition to these mechanism, 32 WTO member states established the ACWL in order to 
contribute voluntary funding and provide legal advice and expertise on cases at the DSB for 
developing countries and LDCs.173 
The WTO provisions allow developing countries to receive preferential treatment which 
can be found in various WTO Agreements - such as agreements on trade in goods, GATT, 
GATS, TRIPS, DSU, trade policy review mechanism and ministrial decisions and 
declarations.174  
This disserttion focuses on the special provisions that allow developing countries to be 
treated more favourably under the WTO dispute settlement system. The DSU specifically 
makes special provision on the consultation phase, composition of panels, panel procedures, 
surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings and technical assistance for 
developing countries.175 In general, these provisions enable developing countries to receive 
longer time-frames for the purpose of implementing the relavent agreement and developing 
countries can also use benefits of technical assistance. 
The first special provision sets out that if a developing country brings a claim against a 
developed country, the panel may extend the time frame if it considers that the normal time 
frame is insufficient for the developing country.176 The second special provision deals with the 
consultations phase and accordingly, it focuses on the particular interests and problems of 
developing countries and all member states should take into account that needs of developing 
countries during the consultation phase.177 The developing countries also have more favourable 
rights in case the dispute takes place between the developing and developed countries in terms 
of composition of the panel. Accordingly, upon a request of the developing country member 
                                            
173 World Trade Organization op cit note 11 at 94.  
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state, one of the panellists in the establishment of the panel should come from a developing 
country member state.178  
  
Thirdly, if a developing country has taken a measure, it may request a longer period of time 
for consultations.179 For instance, if there is a case filed against a developing state, the panel 
shall consider an appropriate period of time for preparation and presentation of a developing 
country’s arguments.180 Fourthly, in case there are one or more developing country member 
states participating in the DSU process, the panel shall explain in its report the way how they 
take into consideration of any special differential provision and more-favourable treatment 
raised by the developing country member state.181 Another provision is that the surveillance of 
implementation of recommendations and rulings should pay attention to the matters interlinked 
with the interests of the developing countries.182 In addition to this, if a developing country 
brings a dispute, the DSB shall take into account what appropriate further action can be possible 
apart from normal surveillance and the DSB must also consider the coverage of measures 
complained and their impact on the economic features of the developing country member 
state.183 The last special provision is the technical assistance to the developing countries. On 
the request from a developing country, the WTO Secretariat provides an expert in law for 
providing further legal advice on the matters of dispute settlement to developing country 
member state.184   
4.3 The Low Participation by Developing Countries 
 
The WTO evolved from being a diplomatic process during the GATT years to a judicial process 
and, as has been noted above, it has served as one of the most regulated dispute settlement 
systems in international trade from its establishment in 1995.  
The developing countries participation in the WTO dispute settlement process has been 
discussed by a large number of scholars in the international trade field and it has been argued 
that the WTO DSU system favours richer and developed member states over  developing and 
LDCs, this is as a result of developed countries using more qualified lawyers, and the ability 
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to pursue trade disputes - which is normally a lengthy process and money-consuming.185 
Powerful and wealthier member states are better positioned in the nature of WTO’s complex 
jurisprudence and demanding legal system.186 
In general, developing countries are in less advantageous position against a developed 
country for various reasons - they rely on trade volume, financial aid, technological transfer 
from bigger economies. There is also the fact that the impact of developing countries on 
developed countries’ economies stays at a minimal level.187 Therefore, a balance between 
developed and developing countries in international trade needs to be achieved to enable 
developing countries to contribute to global trade through using the dispute settlement system 
to improve their trade interests and to strengthen their existence in the international arena as 
active players. From another perspective, each and every member state is equal before the 
WTO law, developed and developing countries alike, and the WTO was built to create an equal 
and fair platform for all its member states to bring claims, have them fully investigated, obtain 
recommendations and rulings, as well as effective measures compatible with the WTO rules.188 
 
The WTO DSU has been actively operating from 1995 and there are still some limitations 
for developing countries using the WTO DSU. Some of key factors affecting the developing 
countries’ participation in the WTO DSU will be examined in terms of legal and financial 
sources, ability or inability to enforce rulings, decisions and sanctions. Developing countries 
still have some concern and problems in participating the WTO DSU. Developing countries 
may face disadvantages once they want to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system 
due to their lack of legal capacity if they face developed country. For example, according to 
African countries the dispute settlement system is complex and costly, they cannot present 
effectively in the system because it does not provide a platform to embrace a development 
agenda and the enforcement and compensation system does not work for the developing 
countries.189 Also, the African Group under the WTO expressed their concerns during the 
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Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body that ‘the dispute settlement system is 
complicated and overly expensive’.190 In addition to this, Indian Ambassador and Permanent 
Representative stated their concern about the high costs of the WTO dispute settlement system 
and its deterrent effect for developing countries as an outcome.191 
 
Developing countries, particularly small economies, participate less actively in the WTO 
DSU mainly because of unequal benefits as well as costs of using the system.192 In general, the 
benefit of using the system is interlinked with the stake of developing country in the WTO 
complaint and their exports are in lower value comparing to their claim.193 Therefore, the 
overall benefit from a successful claim does not have a significant impact on developing 
country’s economy. On the cost side, developing countries lack local legal expertise and it is 
expensive to work with foreign legal counsel and/or a renowned law firm.194 For these reasons, 
the possible benefits of using the WTO dispute settlement system and initiating a legal claim 
before the DSB are less likely to exceed the costs of procedure. Therefore, developing countries 
may hold back from using the DSU.  





There are several reasons for low participation in WTO dispute settlement system among 
developing counties. Scholars have shown that the participation of a developing country is 
much lower than developed countries with bigger economies.195 This section will assess the 
elements which limit the developing countries participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system and the consequences of this lack of participation. Existing literature provides three 
possible challenges for developing countries to participate in WTO dispute settlement 
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system.196 First, developing countries might lack legal expertise in the WTO dispute settlement 
matters when identifying trade barrier or monitor the dispute settlement process.197 Secondly, 
developing countries might lack financial resources to initiate a claim before the WTO, to hire 
a legal expertise to be represented before the WTO dispute.198 Lastly, developing countries 
may hold back from participating in the WTO dispute settlement system due to its ineffective 
enforcement rules, such as the retaliatory system and also developing countries may be 
unwilling to claim against more powerful member states.199 Lack of financial resources and 
legal capacity are the most frequently cited participation constraints. In this regard, the legal 
and financial resources and also enforcement concerns will be examined.  
 
The statistics of the WTO dispute settlement shows that member states have filed 522 WTO 
complaints as of February 2017200 The number of complaints and the average number of 
complaints filed per year from the date of 1995 has been as follows:201 
 









2015 2016202 2017203 
Complaints 
 
185 139 78 86 13 17 4 
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37 27.8 15.6 17.2 13 17 4 
 
The following Table 2 and Table 3 clearly show that larger economies such as the USA 
and the EU are the most active members using the WTO dispute settlement system. In this 
sense, the USA or the EU have been involved in 211 complaints as a complaining party, which 
is 38.3 per cent of the total complaints. Likewise, the USA or the EU have been involved in 
214 complaints as the responding party, comprising 40.9 per cent of the total complaints. 
Moreover, the complaints filed by the US and the EU have diminished in recent years and other 
WTO members has become more active.   









2015 2016205 2017206 Total207 
Brazil 6 16 2 3 0 3 1 31 
Canada 15 11 7 1 0 1 0 35 
Chile 2 7 1 0 0 0 0 10 
China 0 1 5 6 1 2 0 15 
EU 47 21 13 14 0 2 0 97 
India 9 7 2 3 0 2 0 23 
Japan 8 4 1 6 2 2 0 23 
                                            
204 Kara Leitner & Simon Lester op cit note 201 at 291. “Note that because some complaints were brought by 
multiple members, the total number of complaining parties exceeds the total number of responding parties for 
some periods.”  
205 For 2016 statistics see, ‘Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, accessed on 22 January 2017.  
206 For 2017 statistics see, ‘Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, accessed on 25 February 2017. 
207 The total number of related disputes were updated in line with the dispute numbers filed in 2017. 
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Korea 3 9 2 3 0 0 0 17 
Mexico 8 5 8 2 0 0 0 23 
USA 60 20 13 14 2 3 2 114 
Other-
developed 
12 6 4 6 4 0 1 33 
Other-
developing 
34 40 20 28 4 2 0 126 
Other-least 
developed 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 204 148 78 86 13 17 4 550 
 









2015 2016209 2017210 Total211 
Brazil 9 3 2 1 1 0 0 16 
Canada 10 3 2 3 0 0 2 20 
Chile 3 7 3 0 0 0 0 13 
China 0 1 16 15 2 4 1 39 
EU 28 23 16 13 2 1 1 84 
India 13 4 3 2 1 1 0 24 
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209 For 2016 statistics see, ‘Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, accessed on 22 January 2017.  
210 For 2017 statistics see, ‘Chronological list of disputes cases’ available at 
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211 The total number of related disputes were updated in line with the dispute numbers filed in 2017. 
 45 
Japan 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 15 
Korea 11 2 1 0 1 1 0 16 
Mexico 3 9 2 0 0 0 0 14 
USA 39 49 20 16 1 5 0 130 
Other-
developed 
20 4 1 9 1 0 0 35 
Other-
developing 
37 32 11 27 4 5 0 116 
Other-least 
developed 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 185 139 78 86 13 17 4 522 
 
The following Table 4 and Table 5 also show the statistics of the complaints filed by the 
member states based on their income classifications.212 Accordingly, the larger economies are 
more active than developing and least developed countries in entering into the WTO dispute 
settlement system. The US and the EU are regular users of the dispute settlement system. On 
the other hand, developing economies with upper middle income and lower middle income 
also use the dispute settlement system and it has been increasing. 
Table 4: Number of complainants by income classification between the dates of 1995 and 
February 2017213 
                                            
212 The income classification method reflects the World Bank’s classification method. ‘World Bank Country and 
Lending Groups’ available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups, accessed on 5 
December 2016. 
213 Kara Leitner & Simon Lester op cit note 201 at 292. For 2017 statistics see also, ‘Chronological list of disputes 
cases’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, accessed on 25 February 
2017. “A number of complaints have been filed by multiple Members acting jointly. In some of these complaints, 
the Members filing the complaint fall into different income categories. Where this is the case, we have counted 
the complaint once in each income category in which at least one complainant falls. Therefore, the number of the 
complaints in this table will add up to more than the total number of complaints under the DSU and also more 
than the number in the table on respondents.” 
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314 116 82 26 
 
Table 5: Number of respondents by income classification between the dates of 1995 and 
February 2017214 





297 105 96 24 
 
All in all, developing countries with lower income face several constraints to access to the 
process of the WTO dispute settlement. The market size and the economic flow in terms of 
import and export also effect the WTO DSU participation level.215 Developed countries are 
more active in initiating the WTO claims because of their huge level of trade flow of export.216 
In parallel, developing countries prefer to initiate claims that have more economic importance 
and economic benefit.217 
4.4.2 Lack of Financial Resources 
 
The first difficulty for developing countries’ participation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is financial and cost issues. Cost is defined as the price for usage of the WTO DSU 
system calculated by members in monetary terms.218 Developing countries hold back from 
using the WTO DSU system because the whole dispute settlement procedure is expensive. As 
                                            
214 Kara Leitner & Simon Lester op cit note 201 at 292. For 2017 statistics see also, ‘Chronological list of disputes 
cases’ available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm, accessed on 25 February 
2017. 
215 Manfred Elsig & Philipp Stucki ‘Low-income Developing Countries and WTO Litigation: Why Wake Up the 
Sleeping Dog?’ (2012) 19:2 Review of International Political Economy 292 at 295. 
216 Thomas Sattler & Thomas Bernauer ‘Gravitation or Discrimination? Determinants of Litigation in the World 
Trade Organization’ (2011) 50:2 European Journal of Political Research. 
217 Andrew T. Guzman & Beth A. Simmons ‘Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants 
in World Trade Organization Disputes’ (2005) 34:2 The Journal of Legal Studies. 
218 Navneet Sandhu ‘Member Participation in The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Can Developing Countries 
Afford not to Participate?’ (2016) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 146 at 153.  
 47 
the WTO dispute settlement system and jurisprudence is getting more complex from the 
consultation to the appeal stage, the burden of legal expenses is also rising for all member 
states, especially for developing countries.219 The complexity of the dispute settlement system 
makes it too expensive and it holds back African countries to use the system effectively.220 
The new appellate review system adopted by the WTO DSU221 has created more complex 
legal requirements. All of those changes and the greater legalization of international trade 
dispute settlement within the system requires more structural need and this resulted in an 
increase of the costs of using the WTO dispute settlement system.222 The developing countries 
faced relatively higher costs for using the WTO DSU in proportion to their national wealth. On 
the other side, the relation between the trading stake and the cost factors have a greater impact 
in terms of participation.223 Developing countries’ benefits in bringing a claim before the WTO 
DSU is relatively low when comparing the cost of the WTO litigation, even if they succeed 
their claim.224 In this sense, if a developing country initiates a dispute under WTO proceedings, 
the outcome of successful settlement of the dispute would be less beneficial. The expected 
benefits out of the WTO litigation sharply declines. Therefore, the absolute trading stake of 
developing countries are a significant factor in determining their participation in the WTO’s 
dispute settlement system.225 The result is that low income countries in the WTO may face 
difficulties in pursuing their legitimate claims arising from the WTO DSU.  
Other concerns exist with regard to other additional costs - such as travel and 
accommodation expenses for developing country officials. A significant budget is required to 
travel overseas and most developing country have very few officials in Geneva handling WTO 
matters and disputes.226 This also causes underrepresentation of developing countries 
diplomatically and technically in Geneva whereas developed countries can afford more trade 
experts in particular areas of WTO.227 
The trend in international litigation and consequently in WTO litigation is to obtain legal 
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advice from the trade legal experts, which becomes more US and Euro-centric as well as highly 
specialized, and costly.228 If developing countries want to work with a private law firm to be 
represented in the WTO cases, parties to disputes can face expensive hourly fees for legal 
advice ranging from $300-$600 or more depending on the volume of the case because the 
jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body increases the demand on lawyer time, which 
automatically increases the hourly workload and the fees.229 The average cost of WTO 
litigation is approximately $100,000.230 As an outcome, the budget for legal expenses for 
developing countries to initiate litigation, to obtain expertise legal advice and to be represented 
by the lawyers cannot be underestimated. There is some significant case law which shows the 
high costs of WTO litigation in practice and one of them is US-Upland Cotton case.231 Thiscase 
involved Brazil against the US, resulting in very high legal costs for Brazil’s cotton trade 
association of over US $2,000,000.232 Another case law, the US-EC Boeing-Airbus dispute233  
was initiated between two developed countries, the US and the European Communities. The 
developed countries and multinational companies were willing to pay much for expertise legal 
advice and the estimated fee in this particular dispute was around $1,000,000 per month and if 
they could not settle the case the total cost could have reached $20,000,000 for each 
company.234 They also hired the biggest US-based law firm to be represented effectively and 
to defend their commercial interest in the global trade arena.235 The European Union trade 
commissioner, Peter Mandelson, pointed out the high cost and concerns on the US-EC Boeing-
Airbus case law that: "America's decision will, I fear, spark probably the biggest, most difficult 
and costly legal dispute in the WTO's history.”236 Even though one can think that every WTO 
member states have equal right to access  the WTO dispute settlement procedure, as it is shown 
from the case law examples it is very unlikely for developing countries to initiate a WTO case, 
taking into account these greater legal costs. These examples also demonstrate that the WTO 
dispute settlement system does not distinguish between claims - whether they amount to one 
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million dollars or a claim of one billion dollars. When it comes to practice, enforcing a claim 
of one million dollars and employing government officials requires a huge resource 
commitment for a long period of time. According to the current WTO dispute settlement 
different stages, this time schedule is generally up to three years to litigate a dispute.237 
4.4.3 Lack of Legal Resources 
 
One of the most significant factors of the impediments limiting developing countries usage of 
the WTO dispute settlement system is that developing countries lack of legal capacity, legal 
resources to bring a claim to the WTO.238 It can also regarded as a  lack of human capital 
resource in order to pursue WTO dispute settlement process.  
 
Following the legalization of the WTO dispute settlement system and more detailed 
litigation structure with different phases, a greater level of legal expertise is needed for all 
member states to participate in WTO litigation.239 Developing countries’ need for having the 
necessary legal capacity enables them to use these complex and demanding disputes settlement 
requirements, to pursue their commercial interest and bring a claim against other member 
states. Therefore, the need for better legal understanding and technical aspects of international 
trade law and professional approach to represent the governments has become highly 
significant. However, many developing countries do not possess this legal capacity in the field 
of international trade law and the WTO law. 
The concept of legal capacity can be defined as usage of the resources in order to identify, 
analyse, pursue and litigate a WTO dispute.240 The developing countries and/or smaller 
economies may face those legal capacity constraints which limits their ability to pursue number 
of cases.241 The connection between the legal capacity to participate the WTO litigation and 
the WTO dispute settlement procedure is significant. As it is stated above, the WTO DSU 
created a more legalized system and the effective usage of the dispute settlement system by the 
member states is relatively affected by this greater legalism.242 As the system is getting more 
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complex, the greater legal capacity to invoke, monitor and pursue rights and obligations and 
the more human resources is needed. The creation of the appellate review system resulted in a 
more complex legal system and the decision of the Appellate Body on the previous panel 
decisions requires more sophisticated legal analysis on WTO law and also public international 
law.243 In this regard, the disputing countries need to possess sufficient human capital resources 
and qualified trade experts. However, it is not always the case. Since developing countries do 
not have many qualified people with the right training and experience level, they are less 
equipped to participate in the WTO dispute settlement procedure.244 Practically, in the situation 
where a less equipped developing country files a claim against a developed country with well-
trained and experienced experts ‘the lack of experience frequently cannot be overcome’.245 
Therefore, although the WTO dispute settlement system is established based on an adjudicatory 
system while supporting the notion of impartiality within the system, the gap in resources 
between developed and developing country is inevitable which results in a perception that the 
‘fight’ is not fair.246  
Developing countries with less legal capacity face a higher opportunity cost when it files a 
complaint.247 Even if developing countries have well trained and experienced experts, once 
those officials focus on one claim, they are not available for other work.248 The lower the 
capacity of the developing country, the lower the possibility to find a trained person to pursue 
the trade cases. Therefore, developing countries might need to hire foreign legal counsel and/or 
private law firm in order to initiate a claim and defend their commercial interests whereas a 
developed country may have in-house government legal counsel who has expertise in WTO 
law and/or international trade matters.249 Again, working with experienced law firms and/or 
foreign legal counsels is very costly for the small economies. 
All in all, a lack of legal capacity of developing countries impacts the participation rate in 
WTO dispute settlement process.  
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4.4.4 Enforcement Concerns 
 
One of the most important factors that makes the WTO dispute settlement procedure the central 
pillar is its ability to enforce the rulings internationally. However, there are some significant 
reasons that developing countries cannot use the enforcement system effectively. Another 
compelling argument by developing countries is the enforcement mechanism of the WTO DSU 
system. Once the panel or appellate body renders its recommendation and ruling, the winning 
member state can rely on compensation and the suspension of concessions at the final stage of 
the process.250 However, the compensation and retaliation is a not very commonly used 
mechanism by developing countries and small economies because the system is not effective 
and it causes additional economic loss.251 The use of the retaliation mechanism is a costly trade 
sanction both for the respondent and claimant party and the developing countries’ fragile and 
small economies are most adversely affected where a retaliation is self-defeating.252 
Additionally, if the respondent party is a developed party, the impact of the retaliation is less 
than the economic loss it caused to developing country.253 For the reason that the retaliation 
mechanism does not work effectively for the developing countries, they are unwilling to initiate 
a dispute settlement mechanism under the WTO DSU against developed countries.254 
Additionally, it can be also seen as a power-based factor because developing countries are 
reluctant to take an action against powerful and strong economies and this causes them not to 
participate in the dispute settlement system as much as the developed countries. Even though 
there are measures of a successful dispute, they do presently work for developing countries.  
 
The retaliation provides a system in which the trade relations between member states is an 
‘eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth’ which does not rebalance the trade loss and it does not 
give incentive to parties in dispute to be in compliance with the WTO rules but rather creates 
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a greater economic damage on the complainant party.255 To sum up, developing countries may 
face difficulties in enforcing the recommendations and rulings due to their limited retaliatory 
power and this causes a lack of participation in the WTO’s dispute settlement system. 
Developing countries hold back from initiating claims against the developed countries because 
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CHAPTER V POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO FACILITATE THE PARTICIPATION  OF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRY IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Developing countries may have difficulties in entering into the WTO’s dispute settlement 
proceedings due to number of significant constraints which have been highlighted in this 
research. Despite certain constraints for developing countries in participating in the DSU, usage 
of the dispute settlement mechanism has been increased as it is seen from the growing number 
of disputes in recent years.256 To the date 522 trade disputes have been submitted to the WTO 
for settlement.257 The growing number demonstrates that the WTO members have a strong 
confidence in the system thereby the governments shall work in coordination to address 
challenges and improve the overall efficiency of the dispute settlement system. In recent years, 
many developing countries have been playing an active role using the dispute settlement 
system.  Moreover, there has been a potential and opportunities for developing countries to be 
more active in international trade by performing their WTO rights and obligations against the 
bigger economies. The question needs to be asked how the dispute settlement mechanism could 
be modified to facilitate the participation of developing countries. In the other words, what are 
the optimal ways to enhance the effectiveness of the dispute settlement system for developing 
countries? In my opinion the dispute settlement mechanism could be more inclusive for 
developing countries and this would build the legitimacy of the DSU. 
This dissertation has touched on the reasons for low participation, possible solutions and 
concluding remarks will be mentioned in this chapter.   
5.1 Financial and Legal Resources  
 
In the previous chapter of this dissertation it was argued that developing countries face high 
costs in order to initiate a dispute within the WTO mechanism. More than that, most developing 
countries have a lower trade stake to initiate a costly WTO litigation process and governments 
of developing countries have a limited budget and human resources to pursue their legitimate 
claims under the WTO DSU. The point was made above that developing countries need to 
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receive funds and legal assistance. For instance, developing countries must pay lawyer’s fees 
to challenge a developed country trade barrier.258 If developing countries are given an 
opportunity to reclaim their legal fees which is  ‘easily affordable payments from large 
developed countries who fail to settle a case or comply with a panel decision’259, then 
developing countries may participate more actively to the DSU. Some developing countries 
offered if a trade dispute involves a developing and a developed country and in case developing 
country wins the dispute, the developed country is required to bear the developing country’s 
litigation cost involving lawyers’ fees, costs for preparation of necessary documents and 
participation in the consultations, panel and the Appellate Body proceedings.260  
To sum up, the considerable cost of initiate and pursue a WTO case before the panel and 
Appellate Body has a strong impact on developing countries’ participation. Lack of financial 
sources draw back governments of developing countries from enforcing their WTO rights 
against a violating party. Possible solutions could facilitate developing countries’ participation 
in the dispute settlement system as well as supporting developing countries’ rights and 
obligations under the DSU. Once the dispute costs will be reduced, the volume of cases taken 
by the developing countries will be higher.  
5.2 The Role of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Dispute Settlement 
 
A major constraint for developing countries is the lack of legal assistance. The ‘Agreement 
Establishing the ACWL’ established the ACWL in 2001 as a separate and independent 
organisation from the WTO to provide legal services on WTO law and the WTO dispute 
settlement process to eligible developing countries and LDCs.261 Developing countries still 
cannot bear the high litigation fees of initiating disputes and therefore, they need more efficient 
legal assistance on WTO law and litigation procedure. In this regard, the ACWL provides low-
cost legal services to developing countries and LDCs during the WTO litigation proceedings 
as well as assistance in the preparation of legal documents and the representation in WTO 
disputes.262 Also, more legal training opportunities for developing country officials is essential 
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for WTO members to be aware of their WTO rights under the DSU, and this is supported by 
the ACWL. In this sense, the ACWL performs to address the participation constraints in the 
form of legal capacity and cost of litigation constraints of developing countries and LDCs in 
the WTO dispute settlement system.  
Member states can take advantage of their rights and obligations under the WTO if they 
are able to understand how the WTO operates and how the disputes are settled. The WTO law 
has a complex structure with its over 20 agreements, with more than 20,000 pages of schedules 
of concessions and commitments, and the jurisprudence of the dispute settlement body.263 In 
this regard, the ACWL provides necessary knowledge to the eligible WTO members which 
lack legal and financial resources.264 The ACWL gives legal advice free of charge through its 
own staff or external legal counsel on all WTO issues such as procedural and substantive law 
and it also provides legal opinions on different stages of dispute settlement procedure, 
negotiations and trade measures taken by and/or against developing countries and/or LDCs.265 
As well as providing legal advice by ACWL’s staff, the ACWL also offers a network of 
external legal counsels who are expert in international trade law and WTO law. The ACWL 
statistics shows that the ACWL provided support to developing country members and LDCs 
in 51 separate WTO dispute proceedings by its own staff and in seven disputes through external 
legal counsel between 2001 and 2017 and it consist of approximately 20 per cent of all WTO 
disputes within the same period.266 As of February 2017, 31 private law firms and four 
individuals had agreed to offer legal services through the ACWL.267 The ACWL also provides 
training programmes specialized in the WTO law by offering trainee programme, annual 
courses, seminars and the Secondment Programme for Trade Lawyers and up to date 16 
                                            
263 ‘The ACWL’s Mission’ available at http://www.acwl.ch/acwl-mission/, accessed on 6 December 2016. 
264 Ibid.  
265 ‘Legal Advice’ available at http://www.acwl.ch/legal-advice/, accessed on 6 December 2016. 
266 Advisory Centre on WTO Law ‘Report On Operations 2015’ (2015) p 20. ‘Disputes which involves multiple 
complainants are counted as a single dispute.’ See also, ‘Assistance in WTO dispute settlement proceedings since 
July 2001’ available at http://www.acwl.ch/wto-disputes/, accessed on 6 December 2016. 
267 ‘External Counsel’ available at http://www.acwl.ch/external-counsel/, accessed on 25 February 2017. The law 
firms are: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Arent Fox, Berwin Leighton Paisner LLP, Borden Ladner 
Gervais, Crowell & Moring, Economic Laws Practice, FratiniVergano, Gide Loyrette Nouel, Hogen Lovells, 
Jochum Shore & Trossevin, JWK Law Office, Jones Day, K&L Gates, King&Spalding, 
Lakshmikumaran&Sridharan, Amelia Porges PLLC, Lewin&Wills, Luthra&Luthra Law Offices, Mayer Brown, 
Minter Ellison, NCTM Studio Legale Associato, Nishimura&Asahi, Shin&Kim, Sidley Austin LLP, Gary N. 
Horlick, Thompson Hine, Tilpa International Trade & Investment Law, Van Bael & Bellis, VVGB Advocaten / 
Avocats, White & Case, Winston & Strawn LLP. 
 56 
developing countries and seven LDCs have benefited from the Secondment Programme for 
Trade Lawyers.268  
The ACWL is funded on a voluntary basis, mainly by high income WTO members and also 
developing countries make contributions to the Endowment Fund based on their economic 
share within the international trade and income per capita.269 However, richer economies can 
refrain from funding the ACWL due to some political reasons that may challenge their own 
actions under the WTO.270 The ACWL therefore needs reform in terms of its funding sources. 
In this regard, WTO and ACWL can work together to create an awareness of the importance 
of Endowment Fund for developing and LDCs. Alternatively, the ACWL could obtain funding 
from non-governmental sources.271 The more funders and supporters will also show that the 
legal assistance to developing countries and their participation to the WTO dispute settlement 
system is essential for global trade and it will also encourage the richer economies to contribute 
the Endowment Fund.  
The ACWL does not provide legal advice prior to a WTO case. However, developing 
countries need to identify the violation and prepare pre-litigation documents in order to initiate 
and pursue a successful case. In this regard, the ACWL mechanism only offers low-cost legal 
services to governments of developing countries but not necessarily the exporters or trade 
industry associations who are the significant players of the public-private partnership to enforce 
their rights against the violators.272  Another problem is that the ACWL does not have any staff 
who are expert economists and consequently it cannot provide technical economic advice. 
However, a strong WTO case about international trade issues requires an economic and legal 
partnership and professional economists are able to provide assistance in using technical 
economic tools and economic evidence.273 For this reason, the ACWL could broaden its legal 
services for developing countries in terms of pre-litigation assistance. Besides, the ACWL 
could strengthen its legal services to provide quality legal assistance to developing countries 
in order to encourage them to be active in the WTO dispute settlement system.  
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The ACWL’s impact in terms of participation has had mixed results. Its subsidized services 
to developing countries have extended their participation in the WTO dispute settlement system 
to some extent. On the other hand, this has not been a sufficient and remarkable solution and 
the ACWL has not addressed all dispute settlement participation concerns in terms of a lack of 
legal and financial capacity that developing countries face. Therefore, the ACWL has a 
supportive effect for developing country participation in the WTO dispute settlement system 
but it has not reached its full performance yet. Although the ACWL decreased the high 
litigation cost of WTO, developing countries still need to pay fees for being represented in the 
WTO dispute settlement proceedings and it still creates difficulty for developing countries. 
Additionally, one may expect that a decrease in the cost of litigation would affect the new WTO 
members’ participation in the dispute settlement system which had no prior WTO dispute 
history. However, the only WTO member which has not prior history in participating WTO 
dispute settlement is Chad which is in the category of low income country.274 All other 
countries using the ACWL services have already had WTO DSU experience. It shows that the 
ACWL assists the WTO member states to pursue additional cases which are already aware of 
their rights and obligations under the WTO and have the capacity to identify potential WTO 
violations to initiate a case.  
All in all, the ACWL’s contribution to the WTO law encourages developing countries to 
be more active in the dispute settlement process. However, it still needs to be improved in order 
to achieve more concrete results. 
5.3 Private Law Firms 
 
Most governments do not have sufficient legal expertise and the legal capacity to pursue a case 
before an international court, so experts in international law and lawyers as advocates and 
advisors act on behalf of governments.275 The need for representation before the WTO panel 
and Appellate Body by lawyers is even more specific involving WTO law and dispute 
settlement. Therefore, governments need highly specialized lawyers in the WTO law and 
dispute settlement process. Many private law firms offer legal services in WTO litigation to 
clients; private law firms could be a part of solution for assisting governments of developing 
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countries.  
Private law firms could provide legal assistance to developing countries on pro bono or at 
reduced fees in return law firms improve their reputation worldwide as being a contributor to 
the public benefit.276 Big international law firms can take the advantage of pro bono service in 
terms of representing a significant precedent and the value of pro bono service generates more 
reputation and income in the long run for the law firm’s efforts.  
Private law firms can also coordinate with the ACWL.277 There are already 30 private law 
firms and four individuals registered in the ACWL’s roster of external legal counsel system in 
order to provide legal services to developing countries in WTO dispute settlement at reduced 
rates.278 This is an example for other private law firms to offer similar services on pro bono 
basis or at reduced rates to developing countries either through ACWL or on their own 
initiative. Also, acquiring legal advice from private international law firms could be a faster 
solution than funding from the WTO or ACWL because legal experts can monitor possible 
WTO violations in order to assist developing countries to initiate proceedings. Since the 
ACWL is not entitled to investigate any possible WTO violation, it cannot provide legal 
services to developing country exporters prior to a viable WTO case279. Moreover, developing 
countries do not have to depend on solely ACWL or WTO funding. For that reason, working 
jointly with private law firms could create a long-term solution for developing countries to 
access to legal services and pre-litigation investigation. 
5.4 Public-Private Partnership 
 
A strong public-private partnership is helpful in initiating a viable case over trade issues at the 
WTO. Developing countries face difficulty in identifying possible WTO violations against 
their exporters which may cause financial damages to the domestic economy. Developing 
country governments are the only authorized bodies which may seek subsidized legal 
assistance under the current WTO system.280 Exporters and trade industry associations are the 
key players which are directly affected by the detrimental effects of WTO violations made by 
the member countries. However, they cannot approach the WTO or ACWL directly to get their 
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legal claim investigated and present their challenge before the WTO; rather they must persuade 
their government to take a necessary step at the WTO or ACWL. Therefore, private sector need 
to create an active collaboration with the government to raise WTO claims. Prior to a viable 
case, the private sector could come up with the necessary economic and legal research to 
convince the government of the benefits to initiate a case before the WTO. Exporters and trade 
industry associations could be involved in the WTO process as being a key part of the public-
private partnership.281 Thus, the private sector in developing countries could assist and 
influence their government officials to prepare legal claims for the WTO dispute settlement 
process. The private sector could support developing countries’ usage of the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism by engaging government officials to address the need for legal 
assistance in WTO litigation.  
Importers and consumers in developed countries could constitute a separate group with 
private interests in supporting developing country exporters due to their interest in accessing 
the developing country market.282  
To sum up, a public-private partnership framework could function through the active 
collaboration of exporters, trade industry associations, importers and consumer groups by 
raising WTO claims, getting them investigated, getting support from private law firms and 
finally in convincing the developing country governments to negotiate in the shadow of the 
law by using consultation or mediation method for their WTO disputes.  
5.5 Consultation and Mediation  
A consultation stage has been offered by the DSU as an alternative solution during the course 
of the dispute by any disputing party to solve the dispute between the WTO members.283 The 
WTO members must engage in a consultation stage before bringing a case in order to attempt 
to ensure a positive mutually acceptable decision to a dispute.284 The DSU supports the 
countries to enter into consultation in order to settle their disputes amicably.285 The DSU also 
provides special provision for developing countries in terms of consultation which states that 
developing members shall be given special attention to their problems and interests during 
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consultations.286 The DSU provides extended timeframes in favour of developing countries in 
terms of consultations.287 The consultation stage can be used as an alternative solution to 
facilitate developing country participation in the dispute settlement because it avoids 
developing countries  using their financial sources to initiate a whole WTO dispute settlement 
process; it also avoids the enforcement procedure for the panel or Appellate Body rulings 
against developed countries. For instance, Jamaica proposed to strengthen the consultation 
stage for developing countries to use the dispute settlement mechanism more often instead of 
using a costly and lengthy panel process.288  
The consultation process has been used effectively by the WTO members because a 
common settlement was found or the complainant party decided it did not want to pursue the 
case for specific reasons. 157 disputes have been solved by using consultation which 
approximately equals 30 per cent of all WTO disputes since 1995.289 This shows that 
consultation is an effective alternative means of dispute settlement and WTO members can 
settle their trade disputes without initiating a litigation process.  
 
Members also can use other alternative dispute instruments by using good offices, 
conciliation and mediation. If the consultation stage fails, disputing parties could use mediation 
as an intervening option in which a third party assist in resolving the dispute.290 Again, the 
parties can avoid using costly and time-consuming litigation proceeding.  
Developing countries can benefit from mediation by using the third party assistance in 
resolving their disputes. Article 5 of the DSU provides that countries may choose the Director-
General of the WTO as the mediator due to his/her knowledge and expertise on the WTO law; 
this considered to provide a ‘mediator with muscle’.291 Mediation as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism can be undertaken voluntarily upon the parties’ consent.292 There are 
those who have proposed changing the voluntarism to something more compulsory; Haiti 
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proposed that the good offices, conciliation and mediation shall be mandatory for members 
before initiating a case.293 
Mediation can address the problems that developing countries face under the DSU process. 
First, mediation does not create a hostile or political opposition environment and it provides 
countries with a way to solve their dispute mutually. Secondly, once the parties agree on 
mediation, they can also enforce the mutually agreed solution voluntarily. Therefore, 
developing countries do not face any difficulty arising from the enforcement process, such as 
using retaliatory counter-measures.  
The first example of the mediation under the WTO is the Thailand/Philippines/EU tuna 
dispute.294 The lesson of this is that developing countries can use their right to mediation under 
the WTO  in order to secure more equal treatment from a developed country.295  However, this 
is the only case that countries employed the mediation as a form of dispute settlement. 
Moreover, there has not been much academic research on mediation as an alternative solution 
for developing countries in the DSU.  
Developing countries could use mediation against developed countries more frequently 
because of its benefits in terms of financial resources. It has been argued that mediation could 
solve the problems faced by developing countries in participating in the DSU mechanism. 
Mediation could encourage countries to settle during the negotiation phase. It would also give 
an opportunity to developing countries to seek their WTO rights in a less legalistic and more 
equitable platform. To improve the participation in the DSU process, developing countries shall 
focus on to settle their disputes by means of mediation together with consultations. Developing 
countries are able to clarify the facts of the dispute by consultation and mediation which are 
diplomatic features.  
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
To sum up, many of the WTO members think that the DSU system is working well while some 
of the members think that there is room for improvement.296 In this research, I tried to address 
                                            
293 Submission of the Communication from Haiti to the Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body ‘Text for 
LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement Understanding Negotiations’ TN/DS/W/37, 22 January 2003 p 4. 
294 ‘Thailand: Conciliating a Dispute on Tuna Exports to the EC’ available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case40_e.htm, accessed on 30 December 2016. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Bruce Wilson & Rufus Yerxa op cit note 87 at 253.  
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the capacity constraints of developing countries and how to mitigate them to increase the 
participation in the WTO DSU. In the light of abovementioned issues, first, one should address 
specific problems and needs that developing countries face while implementing WTO law and 
then differential and special treatment articles within the agreements of the WTO about the 
DSU shall be strengthened in order to better collaborate and provide trade related legal support 
and capacity building.297 In my opinion, WTO shall reform its agreements particularly the DSU 
in terms of differential and special treatment articles in favour of the developing countries as 
well as improving its institutional mechanism. My results point out that the capacity building 
is important for developing countries and consultation and mediation shall be used more often 
by developing countries for settling disputes in order to increase the participation in the WTO 
DSU. Considering that developing countries face many challenges and their limited sources to 
participate the DSU, their situation need to be carefully taken into account by the WTO and 
developed countries. Ultimately, WTO legal framework influence the political dynamics 
among the WTO members. A more balanced international platform for settling disputes could 
be created. Therefore, institutional hurdles shall be addressed within the WTO in order to 
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